

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION	)	CASE NO. PAC-E-24-04
OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER FOR	)	
AUTHORITY TO INCREASE ITS RATES	)	DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
AND CHARGES IN IDAHO AND	)	THOMAS R. BURNS
APPROVAL OF PROPOSED	)	REDACTED
ELECTRIC SERVICE SCHEDULES AND	)	
REGULATIONS	)	

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

---

CASE NO. PAC-E-24-04

May 2024

1                   **I.    INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS**

2   **Q.    Please state your name, business address, and current**  
3       **position with PacifiCorp d/b/a Rocky Mountain Power (the**  
4       **"Company").**

5    A.   My name is Thomas R. Burns, my business address is 825  
6       NE Multnomah Street, Suite 600, Portland, Oregon 97232.  
7       I am currently employed as Vice President of Resource  
8       Planning and Acquisitions for PacifiCorp.

9   **Q.    Please describe your education and professional**  
10       **experience.**

11   A.   I graduated from Illinois State University with a  
12       Bachelor of Science degree in Economics. I joined  
13       PacifiCorp in 2007 and assumed the responsibilities of  
14       my current position in September 2022. Over this period,  
15       I held several operational, analytical and leadership  
16       positions within the Company. My previous role with  
17       PacifiCorp was Director of Energy Supply Management,  
18       Operations, and Reliability. In that role I was  
19       instrumental in the design and implementation of the  
20       Western Energy Imbalance Market.

21   **Q.    Briefly describe the responsibilities of your current**  
22       **position.**

23   A.   I am responsible for PacifiCorp's resource planning and  
24       procurement functions, which include the integrated  
25       resource plan ("IRP"), structured commercial business

1 and valuation activities, and long-term load forecasts.  
2 Most relevant to this general rate case, I oversee the  
3 planning, analysis, and outreach processes that are used  
4 to develop PacifiCorp's IRP, and the economic analysis  
5 that helps guide the Company's resource acquisitions.

## 6 II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY

7 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this case?**

8 A. I provide economic analysis that supports PacifiCorp's  
9 decisions to: acquire the 190-megawatt ("MW") Rock Creek  
10 I wind facility; and acquire and repower the 43 MW Foote  
11 Creek II-IV and 50 MW Rock River I wind facilities in  
12 Wyoming.

13 I also summarize PacifiCorp's assessment of the  
14 projects from the 2021 IRP and IRP Update, 2020 All-  
15 Source Request for Proposals ("2020AS RFP"), and  
16 customer benefits that result from these projects.

17 **Q. Please provide an overview of your testimony for Rock  
18 Creek I.**

19 A. My economic analyses show that the project is in the  
20 public interest and will generate significant benefits  
21 for Idaho customers across all scenarios. Analysis  
22 prepared before passage of the Inflation Reduction Act  
23 ("IRA") showed risk-adjusted benefits ranging from a  
24 present-value revenue requirement differential  
25 ("PVRR(d)") \$2 million benefit to customers in the low

1 natural gas, no carbon scenario, to a \$20 million benefit  
2 in the medium natural gas, medium carbon scenario.

3 The post-IRA analysis of both Rock Creek I and Rock  
4 Creek II (a co-located sister facility that the Company  
5 analyzed together with Rock Creek I after passage of the  
6 IRA) yields customer benefits totaling \$298 million,  
7 that rise to \$318 million on a risk-adjusted basis under  
8 an MM price-policy scenario. Conservatively, these  
9 benefits do not assign any value to the renewable energy  
10 certificates ("RECs") that will be generated by Rock  
11 Creek I and Rock Creek II, which can provide additional  
12 customer benefits if sold, transferred, or used to  
13 comply with relevant state requirements.

14 **Q. Please provide an overview of your testimony for Foote**  
15 **Creek II-IV and Rock River I repowering projects.**

16 A. My economic analyses indicate that these projects are in  
17 the public interest and will generate benefits for Idaho  
18 customers.

19 Benefits for Foote Creek II-IV range from \$53.07  
20 million when using medium natural gas and medium carbon  
21 dioxide ("CO<sub>2</sub>") assumptions to \$142.77 million for high  
22 natural gas and the social cost of greenhouse gases  
23 assumptions prior to adjusting for benefits from the  
24 IRA. This is compared to a \$17.09 million customer cost  
25 in the LN scenario. These benefits increase to \$76.49

1 million when using medium natural gas and medium CO2  
2 assumptions and \$104.23 million for high natural gas and  
3 high CO2 assumptions when factoring in the IRA.  
4 Importantly, the only scenario where Foote Creek II-IV  
5 was expected to generate customer costs prior to passage  
6 of the IRA—the LN scenario (\$17.09 million)—has  
7 transformed to a \$6.33 million customer benefit. These  
8 benefits only increase under the highest cost of carbon  
9 scenario (MM-SCGHG).

10 Similarly, benefits for Rock River I range from  
11 \$30.15 million when using medium natural gas and medium  
12 CO<sub>2</sub> assumptions to \$67.76 million for high natural gas  
13 and high CO<sub>2</sub> assumptions before adjusting for the IRA.  
14 When factoring in the IRA, these benefits increased to  
15 \$54.09 million when using medium natural gas and medium  
16 CO<sub>2</sub> assumptions and \$91.69 million for high natural gas  
17 and high CO<sub>2</sub> assumptions.

18 Like Rock Creek I, the analyses of both facilities  
19 does not assign any value to the RECs that will be  
20 generated by either Foote Creek II-IV or Rock River I,  
21 which will provide additional customer benefits if sold,  
22 transferred, or used to comply with relevant state  
23 requirements.



1 retail service. Each IRP is developed through an open  
2 and public process, with input from an active and diverse  
3 group of stakeholders, including state regulatory  
4 commissions, state consumer-advocacy departments,  
5 customer-sponsored advocacy groups, environmental-  
6 advocacy groups, resource-advocacy groups, independent-  
7 power producers, project developers, other utilities,  
8 and customers. During the public-input process, which  
9 typically spans at least a full year before the release  
10 of a full IRP, PacifiCorp holds regular meetings with  
11 stakeholders to solicit feedback on the Company's  
12 planning assumptions, methodologies, and model results.

13 **Q. Did the Company's 2021 IRP identify a need for additional**  
14 **resources to serve PacifiCorp's customers?**

15 A. Yes. The primary focus of any IRP is to forecast the  
16 need for resources and evaluate different strategies to  
17 meet that need over time. The Company's 2021 IRP  
18 indicated that PacifiCorp has a capacity deficit in all  
19 years of the planning horizon—starting at 1,071 MW in  
20 2021 and increasing to over 6,600 MW by 2040. In 2025,  
21 the resource need in the 2021 IRP is 1,627 MW. As  
22 described further below, this need has increased since  
23 the 2021 IRP was released.

1 **Q. How does the 2021 IRP preferred portfolio address the**  
2 **need for new resources?**

3 A. The 2021 IRP preferred portfolio represents PacifiCorp's  
4 least-cost, least-risk plan to reliably meet customer  
5 demand over a 20-year planning period. Using a range of  
6 cost and risk metrics to evaluate numerous resource  
7 portfolios, PacifiCorp selected a preferred portfolio  
8 that reflects a cost-conscious plan that includes near-  
9 term investments in renewable resources that can capture  
10 tax credits before they expire or decrease, and new  
11 transmission infrastructure to facilitate the  
12 interconnection and delivery of these resources. These  
13 new resources and transmission investments are lower  
14 cost than other resource and transmission alternatives  
15 and are necessary to reliably serve our customers.

16 **Q. Can you describe the methodology that PacifiCorp used in**  
17 **the 2021 IRP to analyze the economics of the preferred**  
18 **portfolio?**

19 A. Yes. PacifiCorp incorporated a new and more advanced  
20 optimization modeling system called PLEXOS. The PLEXOS  
21 modeling system provides three platforms (referred to as  
22 Long-term ("LT"), Medium-term ("MT") and Short-term  
23 ("ST")), which work on an integrated basis to inform the  
24 optimal combination of resources by type, timing, size,  
25 and location over PacifiCorp's 20-year planning horizon.



1 Please refer to Company witness Rick T. Link's testimony  
2 for additional detail regarding PLEXOS and the LT, MT,  
3 and ST platforms.

4 **Q. Does PacifiCorp have a need for Rock Creek I?**

5 A. Yes. As discussed above, the 2021 IRP preferred  
6 portfolio indicated a demonstrated need for new  
7 resources. The Company proposed to begin addressing this  
8 need through 1,792 MW of new wind generation resulting  
9 from the 2020AS RFP, which included Rock Creek I.<sup>1</sup>

10 **Q. Please describe key factors that support including Rock  
11 Creek I in PacifiCorp's 2021 IRP preferred portfolio.**

12 A. The project is expected to meet the Company's near-term  
13 resource need and provide significant customer benefits  
14 by providing zero-fuel cost generation and substantial  
15 production tax credit ("PTC") benefits, while mitigating  
16 risks associated with future regulation of carbon-  
17 emitting resources.

18 **Q. Please describe the reliability benefits of projects  
19 like Rock Creek I.**

20 A. Rock Creek I reduces the Company's exposure to price and  
21 volume volatility by reducing the need for market  
22 purchases. Increased reliance on the market exposes  
23 customers to price volatility and price spikes that  
24 occur when the region experiences severe weather events

---

<sup>1</sup> 2021 IRP, Vol. I, Ch. 9.

1 or system disruptions. Such events increase net power  
2 costs, and the magnitude of increase is directly  
3 proportional to the volume of purchases needed. In  
4 short, there is no guarantee that there will be a seller  
5 when PacifiCorp needs to make a short-term purchase to  
6 serve its load. This risk also exists for firm forward  
7 market purchases, where the seller could cut scheduled  
8 deliveries and accept liquidated damages if they do not  
9 have sufficient supply to meet their contractual  
10 obligations of the sale. As discussed in Company witness  
11 Link's testimony, Western Electricity Coordinating  
12 Counsel and North American Electric Reliability  
13 Corporation ("NERC") reliability studies highlight the  
14 risks of resource shortfalls across the region in the  
15 coming years.

16 **Q. How do these studies relate to Rock Creek I?**

17 A. Each of these studies confirm the generally accepted  
18 understanding that the west is facing increasing  
19 resource adequacy risks in the near term. More recently,  
20 NERC further confirmed these findings and warned in its  
21 2022 Summer Reliability Assessment that several regions  
22 in North America were at high or elevated risk of power  
23 outages this past summer due to above-normal

1 temperatures and drought conditions, particularly in the  
2 western half of Canada and the United States.<sup>2</sup>

3 Rock Creek I will help mitigate the risk that there  
4 may be inadequate supply to support market purchases and  
5 reduce exposure to price spikes in periods where demand  
6 threatens to exceed supply for market purchases.

7 **Q. Was Rock Creek I selected in the 2020AS RFP?**

8 A. Yes. As discussed in Company witness Link's testimony,  
9 the 2020AS RFP final shortlist included six final  
10 shortlist bids representing over 1,600 MW of wind  
11 generation that seek to interconnect to PacifiCorp's  
12 transmission system. These bids include Rock Creek I  
13 which, with Rock Creek II, were the only two bids that  
14 were not power purchase agreements.

15 **Q. Following its selection in the 2020AS RFP final**  
16 **shortlist, did the Company begin negotiating a BTA for**  
17 **Rock Creek I?**

18 A. Yes. As discussed by Company witness Wagner, the Company  
19 engaged in BTA negotiations with Invenergy for the  
20 project.

---

<sup>2</sup> 2022 Summer Reliability Assessment, North American Electric  
Reliability Corporation (May 2022)  
([https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC\\_SRA\\_2022.pdf](https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_2022.pdf)).

1 **Q. Were negotiations impacted by current economic**  
2 **conditions?**

3 A. Yes. Bidder development efforts were challenged by  
4 importation restrictions related to China, COVID-19  
5 international impacts, and hostilities in Ukraine that  
6 created significant logistics and supply chain  
7 challenges associated with solar panels, wind turbines,  
8 lithium batteries, transformers, and many balance-of-  
9 plant materials. As a result, many developers have been  
10 forced to abandon established supply chains and revert  
11 to new suppliers (if available), which has materially  
12 impacted overall renewable power plant pricing and  
13 commitments toward project in-service dates.

14           Given PacifiCorp's need for generation resources,  
15 PacifiCorp allowed pricing adjustments from all final  
16 shortlist projects from the 2020AS RFP, as well as  
17 limited extensions to commercial operations dates.  
18 Despite this additional flexibility, some of the bids  
19 from the final shortlist were unable to provide firm  
20 prices and were not available for selection. This  
21 contributed to an under procurement of 902 MW of solar  
22 capacity and 497 MW of battery capacity.

23 **Q. Have current economic conditions impacted costs for Rock**  
24 **Creek I compared to the costs from initial bids?**

25 A. Yes. Given the market dynamics discussed above, the

1 overall costs for Rock Creek I has increased from its  
2 initial bid in the 2020AS RFP. My economic analysis below  
3 is based on updated project costs.

4 **Q. Were there any additional benefits associated with Rock**  
5 **Creek I that offset these increased costs?**

6 A. Yes. PacifiCorp's original economic analysis in the  
7 2020AS RFP assumed that Rock Creek I qualified for a 60  
8 percent PTC through the first 10 years of operation. As  
9 a result of the IRA, the economic analysis in this case  
10 reflects the value of the 110 percent PTC, in addition  
11 to the updated project costs. These updates cause a  
12 significant and positive change in the economic benefits  
13 of the project.

14 **Q. Have current economic drivers also impacted the**  
15 **Company's resource needs?**

16 A. Yes. While the costs of 2020AS RFP bids have increased,  
17 the Company's resource needs have also increased. It is  
18 also important to consider the broader regional capacity  
19 need that aligns with the Company's need and expected  
20 in-service date for Rock Creek I. The 2020AS RFP included  
21 virtually every potential non-market resource in the  
22 region capable of achieving commercial operation by  
23 2025. Meeting this near-term need with physical assets  
24 that will provide incremental generation capacity

1 effectively limits the Company's options to bidders in  
2 the 2020AS RFP.

3 Therefore, the 2020AS RFP bids and Rock Creek I  
4 remain necessary to reliably serve Idaho customers, and  
5 Rock Creek I selection in the RFP confirms it is part of  
6 the least-cost, least-risk resources available to meet  
7 the Company's need.

8 **Q. Did the Company prepare an update to the 2021 IRP?**

9 A. Yes. On March 31, 2022, the Company issued its 2021 IRP  
10 Update.<sup>3</sup>

11 **Q. What is the purpose of the 2021 IRP Update?**

12 A. The IRP update is a checkpoint on the 2021 IRP action  
13 plan and ensures that changes in the planning  
14 environment are considered between the two-year IRP  
15 planning cycle. The 2021 IRP Update assessed whether  
16 evolving trends and events impact customers and required  
17 changes to the action plan to deliver resources and  
18 transmission investments. Relevant here, the 2021 IRP  
19 Update reflects resource planning and procurement  
20 activities that occurred since the 2021 IRP, and present  
21 an updated load-and-resource balance and an updated  
22 resource portfolio.

---

<sup>3</sup> PacifiCorp 2021 Integrated Resource Plan Update (Mar. 31, 2022)  
(<https://www.pacificorp.com/energy/integrated-resource-plan.html>).

1 **Q. Was Rock Creek I included in the Company's 2021 IRP**  
2 **Update preferred portfolio?**

3 A. Yes.<sup>4</sup>

4 **Q. Where there any important modeling updates in the 2021**  
5 **IRP Update?**

6 A. As discussed in Chapter 5 of the 2021 IRP Update, key  
7 updates in addition to the load-and-resource balance  
8 include the resource changes due to 2020AS RFP activity,  
9 which is discussed further below. Importantly, the EPA's  
10 pre-publication version of the OTR, released on March  
11 11, 2022, was not modeled in the 2021 IRP Update.

12 **Q. Did the 2021 IRP Update continue to show a need for**  
13 **additional generation resources?**

14 A. Yes. As discussed in Company witness Link's testimony,  
15 the need increased due to an increase in forecast load.  
16 The 2021 IRP Update shows a resource need in all years  
17 of the planning horizon—starting at 1,584 MW in 2022 and  
18 increasing to 6,755 MW in 2040. In 2025, the resource  
19 need is 1,867 MW, an increase of 240 MW, or approximately  
20 15 percent, relative to the resource need identified in  
21 the 2021 IRP. The higher load reflected in the 2021 IRP  
22 Update approaches the level analyzed in the high-load  
23 sensitivity conducted in the 2021 IRP. The most recent

---

<sup>4</sup> *Id.* at Ch. 7, Action Item 2e, at 103 (Mar. 31, 2022).

1 load forecast is even higher than that assumed in the  
2 2021 IRP Update.

3 Moreover, now that the 2020AS RFP has ended,  
4 PacifiCorp was unable to execute firm contracts with all  
5 projects on the final shortlist. Due to national tariff  
6 policies, global supply-chain issues, and inflationary  
7 pressures, some projects on the 2020AS RFP final  
8 shortlist were unable to move forward. Consequently,  
9 PacifiCorp's procurement was reduced by 902 MW of solar  
10 resources and 497 MW of battery storage resources. This  
11 under-procurement adds to our need for new resources.

12 **Q. Does the 2021 IRP Update consider the reliability issues**  
13 **related to reliance on market purchases?**

14 A. Yes. Given near-term concerns over resource adequacy,  
15 and because of the acquisition of additional resources  
16 including Rock Creek I, the 2021 IRP Update's preferred  
17 portfolio shows generally lower market purchases in the  
18 first five years relative to the 2021 IRP preferred  
19 portfolio.<sup>5</sup>

20 **B. Modeling Assumptions and Methods**

21 **Q. Did the Company analyze Rock Creek I and Rock Creek II**  
22 **together?**

23 A. Yes, for the most part. As stated above, there were two  
24 BTA wind facilities in the Company's final shortlist of

---

<sup>5</sup> *Id.* at Figure 1.11.



1 projects: Rock Creek I and Rock Creek II. The second  
2 facility is a larger wind facility, at 400 MW compared  
3 to Rock Creek I at 190 MW. In previous regulatory  
4 proceedings, the Company analyzed the wind projects  
5 together to determine whether acquiring the projects  
6 would provide net benefits to customers. This was  
7 reasonable, because the projects are co-located with  
8 each other and share the same modeling assumptions.

9 In this proceeding the Company is only requesting  
10 rate recovery of Rock Creek I, because Rock Creek II has  
11 an in-service date that falls outside the test period of  
12 this rate case. Nonetheless, several of the analyses  
13 below include combined results from both wind projects,  
14 as well as Rock Creek I specific analyses. This allows  
15 the Commission to examine both the additive benefits  
16 that will occur when wind projects are interconnected to  
17 PacifiCorp's system, but also the Rock Creek I specific  
18 customer benefits that inform the Company's revenue  
19 requirement in this proceeding.

20 **Q. Please summarize the natural gas and CO<sub>2</sub> price**  
21 **assumptions used in the economic analysis of Rock**  
22 **Creek I.**

23 A. The economic analysis of Rock Creek I included three  
24 price-policy scenarios—medium natural gas paired with  
25 medium CO<sub>2</sub> prices ("MM"), medium natural gas prices

1 without a CO<sub>2</sub> price ("MN"), and low natural gas without  
2 a CO<sub>2</sub> price ("LN") price-policy scenarios. While the MM  
3 price-policy scenario represents the Company's "expected  
4 case" describing likely future conditions, the  
5 additional scenarios provide additional helpful  
6 analyses.

7 These assumptions influence the value of system  
8 energy, the dispatch of system resources, and  
9 PacifiCorp's resource mix. Consequently, wholesale-  
10 power prices and CO<sub>2</sub> policy assumptions affect NPC  
11 benefits, non-NPC variable-cost benefits, and system  
12 fixed-cost benefits associated with Rock Creek I.  
13 Because wholesale power prices and CO<sub>2</sub> policy outcomes  
14 are both uncertain and important drivers to the economic  
15 analysis, it is important to evaluate a range of  
16 assumptions for these variables. Table 1 summarizes the  
17 price-policy scenarios.

**Table 1. Price-Policy Scenario Assumption Overview**

<b>Price-Policy Scenario</b>	<b>Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Levelized \$/MMBtu) *</b>	<b>CO<sub>2</sub> Price Description</b>
MM	\$4.52	\$12.10/ton starting 2025 rising to
MN	\$4.52	None
LN	\$2.92	None
*Nominal levelized Henry Hub natural gas price from 2025 through 2040.		

1 **Q. Please describe the natural-gas price assumptions used**  
2 **in the price-policy scenarios.**

3 A. The medium natural gas price assumptions are from  
4 PacifiCorp's official forward price curve ("OFPC") dated  
5 June 30, 2022, which was the most current OFPC available  
6 when PacifiCorp prepared its modeling inputs for the  
7 2020AS RFP. The first 36 months of the OFPC reflect  
8 market forwards at the close of a given trading day (June  
9 30, 2022 in this case). As such, these 36 months are  
10 market forwards as of June 2022. The blending period  
11 (months 37 through 48) is calculated by averaging the  
12 month-on-month market forwards from the prior year with  
13 the month-on-month fundamentals-based price from the  
14 subsequent year. The fundamentals portion of the natural  
15 gas OFPC reflects Aurora-forecast prices.

1 **Q. Please describe the CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions used in the**  
2 **price-policy scenarios.**

3 A. PacifiCorp used two different CO<sub>2</sub> price scenarios—zero  
4 and medium. The medium scenario is derived from a survey  
5 of third-party industry experts, including IHS CERA, and  
6 Wood Mackenzie and the Energy Information Administration  
7 as well as CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions used by peer utilities.  
8 The resulting CO<sub>2</sub> price is applied as a tax beginning in  
9 2025.

10 **Q. Does including potential future CO<sub>2</sub> costs reflect prudent**  
11 **utility planning?**

12 A. Yes. The Company's price-policy scenarios include  
13 varying levels of assumed CO<sub>2</sub> costs to reflect the fact  
14 it is more likely than not that some policy will exist  
15 that will reduce emissions for carbon emitting  
16 resources. When determining CO<sub>2</sub> costs used for planning  
17 purposes, the Company strives to ensure that it is not  
18 an outlier, and the medium price is within a reasonable  
19 range used by the industry to assess risk and conduct  
20 prudent resource planning. The most recent example of  
21 this trend is the Environmental Protection Agency's  
22 ("EPA") proposed Ozone Transport Rule ("OTR")  
23 restricting nitrogen oxide ("NO<sub>x</sub>") emissions from power  
24 plants and other industrial sources. At the time the  
25 Company conducted its economic analyses, this rule would

1 have imposed new environmental compliance obligations  
2 beginning in 2023 and 2024 on coal units in Utah and  
3 Wyoming, respectively, with more severe limitations  
4 applicable in both states by 2026.<sup>6</sup>

5 **Q. Are the modeled CO<sub>2</sub> costs intended to represent a literal**  
6 **carbon tax?**

7 A. No. The modeled CO<sub>2</sub> costs are not intended to explicitly  
8 account for a future tax on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Rather, these  
9 costs capture the effect of policies incentivizing  
10 reduced emissions through benefits or imposing costs  
11 through penalties or other costs resulting from market  
12 dynamics driving the need for zero-emission resources or  
13 customer preferences.

14 **Q. Did PacifiCorp update its load forecast in its analysis**  
15 **of Rock Creek I?**

16 A. Yes. The Company used a sales and load forecast that was  
17 completed in May 2022.

18 **Q. How does the May 2022 forecast compare to the load**  
19 **forecast used in the 2021 IRP?**

20 A. Figures 1 and 2 show PacifiCorp's May 2022 load and peak  
21 forecast relative to the 2021 IRP before incremental

---

<sup>6</sup> While these requirements are now subject to further federal litigation and agency review (see, e.g., *Wyoming, et al., v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, et al.*, 78 F4th 1171 (10th Cir. 2023) (OTR vacated and remanded in part); *Utah, et al., v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, et al.*, No. 23-9509 (Jul. 27, 2023) (staying OTR until final resolution for Utah)), the Company's economic analyses reflects then-current assumptions that the OTR would be in effect.

1 energy efficiency savings. A higher load forecast is  
2 being driven by new industrial and commercial customer  
3 growth, increased air conditioning saturations and  
4 miscellaneous devices and electric vehicle adoption  
5 expectations. The updated load forecast also accounts  
6 for updates to weather, temperature, and line losses to  
7 account for the progression of historical data since the  
8 load forecast that informed the 2021 IRP.

9 On average, over the 2023 through 2040 timeframe,  
10 forecast system load is up 13.6 percent per year and  
11 forecast coincident system peak is up 14.1 percent per  
12 year when compared to the 2021 IRP. Over that same  
13 timeframe, the average annual growth rate for the May  
14 2022 forecast, before accounting for incremental energy  
15 efficiency improvements, is 2.04 percent for load and  
16 1.66 percent for peak.

Figure 1. Forecast Annual System Load





Figure 2. Forecast Annual System Coincident Peak



1 **Q. Has PacifiCorp incorporated the EPA's proposed OTR in**  
2 **its analysis of Rock Creek I?**

3 A. Yes. PacifiCorp modeled two primary components to  
4 reflect the OTR: NO<sub>x</sub> allowance requirements for each of  
5 its units including penalties for units with high  
6 emissions rates, and a dispatch target or shadow price  
7 for NO<sub>x</sub> allowances, which is used to avoid producing NO<sub>x</sub>  
8 emissions during periods when the economic benefits are  
9 relatively low. After running the model, PacifiCorp  
10 compared the results to forecasts of its annual  
11 allocation of NO<sub>x</sub> allowances for Utah and Wyoming.

12 **Q. Please describe how the annual allocation of NO<sub>x</sub>**  
13 **allowances would work under the proposed rule.**

14 A. The proposed rule calls for dynamic budgeting of NO<sub>x</sub>  
15 allowances in 2025 and beyond, with available allowances  
16 allocated among resources within a state based on the  
17 recent historical heat input and emissions rates of each  
18 resource. Under the EPA's proposed rule, the forecast  
19 allocation of NO<sub>x</sub> allowances drops significantly in 2026,  
20 as the EPA assumed that selective catalytic reduction  
21 ("SCR") installations at eligible facilities would  
22 significantly reduce emissions by that year.  
23 PacifiCorp's thermal facilities in Utah would be covered  
24 by the rule beginning 2023 and thermal facilities in  
25 Wyoming could be covered by the rule beginning 2024.



1           While trading of NO<sub>x</sub> allowances among participating  
2 states is allowed, the proposed OTR includes significant  
3 penalties if a state's emissions exceed 121 percent of  
4 its annual allocation. Limited banking of NO<sub>x</sub> allowances  
5 is also allowed, but emissions met via banked allowances  
6 may also be subject to penalties if a state's emissions  
7 exceed 121 percent of its annual allocation. To avoid  
8 such penalties, PacifiCorp's NO<sub>x</sub> emissions during the  
9 ozone season (May-September) in each state cannot exceed  
10 121 percent of PacifiCorp's forecast allocation of NO<sub>x</sub>  
11 allowances for that state.

12 **Q. Please describe how PacifiCorp developed NO<sub>x</sub> allowance**  
13 **requirements for each of its units.**

14 A. In general, an allowance for one ton of NO<sub>x</sub> emissions  
15 would allow the holder of the allowance to emit one ton  
16 of NO<sub>x</sub>. However, starting in 2027,<sup>7</sup> the proposed OTR also  
17 imposes a daily NO<sub>x</sub> emissions rate limit of 0.14 pounds-  
18 per-million British thermal units ("lb/MMBtu") for each  
19 coal-fired facility, and requires emitters to provide an  
20 equivalent of triple allowances for any emissions that  
21 exceed that rate. For example, a resource with an  
22 emissions rate of 0.20 lb/MMBtu would have an effective

---

<sup>7</sup> Coal units that currently have SCR installed must meet the daily backstop limit in 2024. Coal units that do not currently have SCR installed must meet the daily backstop limit in 2027.

1 allowance requirement of 0.32 lb/MMBtu.<sup>8</sup> To calculate  
2 PacifiCorp's NO<sub>x</sub> allowance requirements under the OTR,  
3 starting in 2027 the modeled emission rates for coal  
4 resources whose emissions exceed 0.14 lb/MMBTU were  
5 grossed up to account for the additional surrender of  
6 allowances.

7 **Q. Please describe how PacifiCorp developed a dispatch**  
8 **target to manage its NO<sub>x</sub> allowance requirements.**

9 A. While trading is allowed under the EPA's proposed OTR,  
10 the restrictions on inter-state transfers limit the  
11 number of potential counterparties. PacifiCorp's  
12 generation fleet is an appreciable portion of the  
13 electric generating units in both Utah and Wyoming, so  
14 the potential counterparties that could have allowances  
15 available for sale within those states is quite limited.  
16 With that in mind, PacifiCorp's current planning assumes  
17 that it will comply with the OTR using only its own  
18 combined allocation of NO<sub>x</sub> allowances and is meant to  
19 ensure that its annual allowance requirements do not  
20 exceed 100 percent of the sum of its Utah and Wyoming  
21 allowance allocations. When combined with state-specific  
22 limits previously described, while either PacifiCorp's  
23 Utah or Wyoming NO<sub>x</sub> allowance requirements could be up

---

<sup>8</sup> Effective allowance requirement for resource with emissions rate of 0.20 lb/MMBTU: 100% \* 0.20 lb/MMBtu + 200% \* (0.20 - 0.14) lb/MMBtu = 100% \* 0.20 + 200% \* 0.06 = 0.32 lb/MMBtu.

1 to 121 percent of that state's allocation, any increase  
2 in one state would have to be accompanied by a reduction  
3 in emissions allowance requirements from PacifiCorp  
4 resources in the other state.

5 PacifiCorp's primary production cost analysis  
6 relies upon PLEXOS ST modeling that identifies system  
7 costs for a single deterministic set of expected or  
8 normal input conditions. In reality, and in stochastic  
9 modeling the Company performs using the PLEXOS MT model,  
10 significant variations in inputs such as load, hydro  
11 generation, and thermal availability are a normal course  
12 of operations. Each of these inputs can unexpectedly  
13 increase PacifiCorp's need for NO<sub>x</sub> emission allowances.  
14 Because banking and trading are limited under the OTR,  
15 variations in NO<sub>x</sub> emissions that might otherwise average  
16 out over time must comply in every year and under every  
17 set of conditions. As a result, the NO<sub>x</sub> allowances used  
18 under "normal" input conditions will likely need to be  
19 somewhat below the forecast limit to ensure sufficient  
20 allowances are available to meet unexpected input  
21 conditions.

22 PacifiCorp's analysis indicated that using a NO<sub>x</sub>  
23 allowance dispatch target of [REDACTED] in the ST model  
24 would result in NO<sub>x</sub> allowance requirements that were  
25 under PacifiCorp's forecast allocation and would leave

1 sufficient allowances to meet a range of potential  
2 "above-normal" conditions. Whenever the incremental  
3 value of using a high NO<sub>x</sub> emitting resources exceeds the  
4 dispatch target price, the model will deploy the high  
5 NO<sub>x</sub> resource, rather than lower NO<sub>x</sub> alternatives, which  
6 are typically gas-fired resources or market  
7 transactions. For a coal-fired resource with a NO<sub>x</sub>  
8 emissions rate of 0.20 lb/MMBtu, the NO<sub>x</sub> dispatch target  
9 price means that the resource would not be dispatched  
10 unless it provides at least [REDACTED] in incremental  
11 value relative to no NO<sub>x</sub> alternatives, or a proportional  
12 amount of incremental value relative to lower NO<sub>x</sub>  
13 alternatives.<sup>9</sup>

14 The dispatch target price is used to direct the  
15 model to avoid emissions, and is not a direct cost, as  
16 the Company would receive its allowance allocation free  
17 of charge under the proposed rule. While the Company  
18 could potentially sell allowances, there is little  
19 indication what market prices may prevail, and market  
20 prices may be below this target. As a result, no direct  
21 costs or revenues for allowances are included in the  
22 analysis. The allowance requirements resulting from this

---

<sup>9</sup> A 0.20 lb/MMBTU coal-fired resource would have a NO<sub>x</sub> credit requirement of 0.32 lb/MMBTU in 2027 and beyond, as detailed in footnote 22. A typical average heat rate for a coal-fired resource is 11 MMBtu/MWh. [REDACTED] ÷ 2,000 lb/ton \* 0.32 lb/MMBTU \* 11 MMBtu/MWh = [REDACTED].

1 dispatch target price vary over time as the OTR  
2 requirements take full effect and as the Company's  
3 portfolio evolves. The Company's load forecast and other  
4 modeling inputs also play a role in the resulting  
5 volumes. A comparison of the allowance requirements for  
6 the scenarios relative and forecast allowance  
7 allocations is discussed in the Price-Policy Scenario  
8 Results section later in my testimony.

9 **Q. Please describe the modeling methodology PacifiCorp used**  
10 **in its analysis of Rock Creek I.**

11 A. Consistent with IRP modeling practices, the Company  
12 calculated a system PVRR by identifying least-cost  
13 resource portfolios and dispatching system resources  
14 through 2040, which aligns with the 20-year forecast  
15 period used in the 2021 IRP and 2021 IRP Update. Net  
16 customer benefits are calculated as the PVRR(d) between  
17 different simulations of PacifiCorp's system. One  
18 simulation includes Rock Creek I (and in the combined  
19 studies, both Rock Creek I and II), and the other  
20 simulation excludes them. The simulation that includes  
21 Rock Creek includes transmission interconnection costs.  
22 When the two simulations are compared, changes to system  
23 costs are attributable to Rock Creek. These studies also  
24 include simulations before and after passage of the IRA,  
25 to reflect the value of increased PTCs.

1           PacifiCorp also calculated a PVRR(d) based on one  
2 simulation that includes only Rock Creek I and compares  
3 it to a simulation that excludes both Rock Creek  
4 projects, and one simulation that includes only Rock  
5 Creek II and compares it to a simulation that excludes  
6 both Rock Creek projects. In all studies, the Gateway  
7 West and Gateway South transmission projects discussed  
8 in Company witness Link's testimony were assumed to be  
9 in-service, and beyond 2025 proxy resource options from  
10 the 2021 IRP are available to meet system needs.

11           Customers are expected to realize benefits when the  
12 system PVRR from the simulation with the projects is  
13 lower than the system PVRR without. Conversely,  
14 customers would experience increased costs if the system  
15 PVRR with the projects is higher than the system PVRR  
16 without.

1 **Q. What portfolios did you analyze using the PLEXOS model**  
2 **in this case?**

3 A. Portfolios were analyzed with and without both projects,  
4 with and without Rock Creek I, and with and without Rock  
5 Creek II, including certain results pre-IRA and post-  
6 IRA.

7 **Q. Did PacifiCorp analyze how other assumptions affect its**  
8 **economic analysis of the wind projects?**

9 A. Yes. PacifiCorp analyzed sensitivities that quantify how  
10 changes in capital costs and PTC values influence  
11 projected customer benefits.

12 **C. Price-Policy Scenario Results**

13 **Q. Please summarize the pre-IRA results for the simulations**  
14 **that focused on each Rock Creek project individually.**

15 A. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the PVRR(d) results for each  
16 price-policy scenario for the scenarios that examined  
17 each of the Rock Creek projects prior to passage of the  
18 IRA.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> See also Confidential Exhibit No. 32

**Table 2. Pre-IRA (Benefit)/Cost of Rock Creek I (\$ million)**

<b>Price-Policy Scenario</b>	<b>PVRR (d)</b>	<b>Risk-Adjusted PVRR (d)</b>
MM	(15)	(20)
MN	(9)	(15)
LN	3	(2)

**Table 3. Pre-IRA (Benefit)/Cost of Rock Creek II (\$ million)**

<b>Price-Policy Scenario</b>	<b>PVRR (d)</b>	<b>Risk-Adjusted PVRR (d)</b>
MM	(24)	(33)
MN	(14)	(24)
LN	8	(3)

1           Rock Creek II generally provides a larger benefit,  
2           because it is approximately twice the size of Rock Creek  
3           I. All the same, under the MM price-policy scenario,  
4           Rock Creek I lowers total-system costs by \$15 million,  
5           and adjusted for risk these benefits increase to a \$20  
6           million reduction in system costs. System benefits  
7           generally mirror the results seen in Table 4 when both  
8           projects were considered together, with a slight cost  
9           for Rock Creek I and Rock Creek II in the LN scenario  
10          prior to adjusting for risk and benefits in each of the  
11          other scenarios. Both projects, when evaluated  
12          individually, yield benefits on a risk-adjusted basis  
13          among all three price-policy scenarios.



1 **Q. Why did PacifiCorp decide to update its economic**  
2 **analysis after passage of the IRA?**

3 A. Based on existing law, PacifiCorp's economic analysis  
4 assumed that Rock Creek I and II qualified for 60 percent  
5 of available PTCs through the first 10 years of  
6 operation. After passage of the IRA, the Company  
7 understands that both Rock Creek projects qualify for  
8 110 percent of available PTCs. This provides a  
9 significant increase to the economic benefits from the  
10 projects, and the Company's updated analysis reflects  
11 those benefits. The Company also updated its analysis to  
12 reflect current project costs.

13 **Q. Please summarize the PVRR(d) results post-IRA.**

14 A. Table 4 summarizes the PVRR(d) results for each price-  
15 policy scenario from the combined projects after passage  
16 of the IRA.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> See also Confidential Exhibit No. 33.

**Table 4. Post-IRA (Benefit)/Cost of Rock Creek I and II (\$ million)**


	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e) = (c) + (d)	(f) = (a) + (e)	(g) = (b) + (e)
<b>Price-Policy Scenario</b>	<b>PVRR (d)</b>	<b>Risk-Adjusted PVRR (d)</b>	<b>110% PTC Update</b>	<b>Project Cost Update</b>	<b>Total Update</b>	<b>Updated PVRR (d)</b>	<b>Updated Risk-Adjusted PVRR (d)</b>
MM	(143)	(163)	(197)	42	(155)	(298)	(318)
MN	(33)	(51)	(194)	42	(151)	(185)	(202)
LN	16	2	(195)	42	(153)	(137)	(151)

1 Before adjusting for risk (Column (f)), system costs are  
2 lower when the wind projects are included in the  
3 portfolio in all scenarios: ranging from a \$137 million  
4 customer benefit under the LN scenario to \$298 million  
5 in the MM scenario. When adjusting for risk (Column (g)),  
6 the benefits from the wind projects increase: ranging  
7 from \$151 million in the LN scenario to \$318 million in  
8 the MM scenario. The increase in customer benefits from  
9 the 110 percent PTC is substantial, even when accounting  
10 for the increase in project costs. This updated analysis  
11 supports the necessity of Rock Creek I and indicates it  
12 will produce robust customer benefits. As discussed  
13 earlier, these benefits only increase under a high gas  
14 or a high CO<sub>2</sub> price-policy scenario.

1 Q. How do system costs change post-IRA with and without  
2 both projects?

3 A. Figure 3 summarizes changes in system costs, based on ST  
4 model results using MM price-policy assumptions, when  
5 both projects are eliminated from the portfolio. The  
6 graph on the left shows annual changes in cost by  
7 category and the graph on right shows annual net changes  
8 in total costs (the solid black line) and the cumulative  
9 PVRR(d) of changes to net system costs over time (the  
10 dashed black line). Through 2040, the PVRR(d) shows that  
11 the portfolio that includes both projects is  
12 \$298 million lower cost than the portfolio without both.

**Figure 3. Increase/(Decrease) in System Costs when both  
Projects are Removed from the Portfolio (\$ millions) Medium  
Gas/Medium CO2**



1 **Q. How do the risk-adjusted PVRR(d) results compare to the**  
2 **stochastic-mean PVRR(d) results?**


3 A. For both projects, the risk-adjusted medium gas medium  
4 CO<sub>2</sub> PVRR(d) results show a benefit of \$318 million, which  
5 is higher than the reported ST-model PVRR(d) results of  
6 \$298 million prior to the risk adjustment. This  
7 indicates that the wind projects provide stochastic risk  
8 benefits by making the system less susceptible to  
9 low-probability combinations of load, market price,  
10 hydro generation, and thermal outage volatility that can  
11 increase system costs.

12 **Q. How do the modeled OTR allowance requirements compare to**  
13 **PacifiCorp's forecast allowance allocation?**

14 A. The annual allowance requirements in the ST-model  
15 results are generally slightly below a high estimate of  
16 PacifiCorp's allowance allocation. Based on the  
17 allocation methodology identified in the proposed rule,  
18 this high allowance allocation would likely require  
19 installation of SCR equipment at most of PacifiCorp's  
20 coal-fired generating units that are not equipped with  
21 that technology. In the absence of additional emission  
22 control equipment, PacifiCorp's allocation would be  
23 significantly lower, and well below the allowance  
24 requirements from the ST-model results. The high and low  
25 allocation forecasts and the ST-model results for the MM

1 and MN price-policy scenarios are shown in Confidential  
2 Figure 4. As shown, allowance allocations could be  
3 significantly lower than what is assumed to be available  
4 in the current ST-model results, which would further  
5 increase the value of generation from resources without  
6 emissions, such as Rock Creek I and II.

**Confidential Figure 4. Forecast OTR Allocation and Modeled  
Requirements**



7 **Q. Would Rock Creek I provide customer benefits even if**  
8 **construction costs are higher than expected?**  
9 A. Yes. For both projects, a one percent increase in the  
10 initial capital costs would reduce PVRR benefits through  
11 2040 by \$9.1 million. To negate the \$318 million in

1 risk-adjusted, post-IRA benefits under the MM price-  
2 policy scenario, project costs would need to increase by  
3 35 percent. To negate the \$202 million in risk-adjusted,  
4 post-IRA benefits under the MN price-policy scenario,  
5 project costs would need to increase by 22 percent.

6 **Q. Are the Company's economic analyses of the expected**  
7 **customer benefits from Rock Creek I conservative?**

8 A. Yes. The PVR(d) results for Rock Creek I does not  
9 reflect the potential value of RECs generated by the  
10 incremental energy output from the renewable project.  
11 Customer benefits for all price-policy scenarios would  
12 improve by approximately \$14 million for every dollar  
13 assigned to the incremental RECs that will be generated  
14 through 2040.

15 Similarly, the Company's analyses understate  
16 forecast coal costs for certain system resources,  
17 including the Dave Johnston plant. If corrected to  
18 include the full costs of fuel supply for all plants,  
19 the Company's economic analysis would demonstrate even  
20 higher benefits for Rock Creek I. Additionally, the  
21 natural gas and electricity prices in the Company's  
22 September 2022 OFPC are higher than the values assumed  
23 in the June 2022 OFPC used in the Company's analysis,  
24 which would similarly result in higher benefits for Rock  
25 Creek I.

1                   **IV.    FOOTE CREEK II-IV AND ROCK RIVER I**

2   **Q.    Please describe the acquisition and repowering of the**  
3   **Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I wind facilities.**

4   A.   As described in the confidential testimony of Company  
5       witness Timothy J. Hemstreet, PacifiCorp is acquiring  
6       and repowering the 43 MW Foote Creek II-IV and 50 MW  
7       Rock River I wind facilities. This involves installing  
8       approximately 11 modern wind turbine generators ("WTGs")  
9       at the Foote Creek facilities, and 19 wind turbine  
10      generators at the Rock River I facility. These new  
11      turbines will increase the power generation from the  
12      previous capability, and extend the service life of the  
13      facility, and allow customers to benefit from this  
14      favorable wind site. My testimony provides the economic  
15      justification for the Company's decision to acquire and  
16      repower these facilities.

17                   **A.    Resource Need**

18   **Q.    Did PacifiCorp's preferred portfolio of resources**  
19   **developed in the Company's 2021 IRP include Foote Creek**  
20   **II-IV and Rock River I?**

21   A.   Yes.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> 2021 IRP, Ch. 1 Action Plan, Action Item 2b, at 25.

1 **Q. Please describe the key factors for including Foote**  
2 **Creek II-IV and Rock River I in the 2021 IRP preferred**  
3 **portfolio.**

4 A. The projects are anticipated to be fully online and  
5 serving customers before 2025. This timing enables both  
6 projects to deliver needed energy and capacity for  
7 customers before the availability of either new proxy  
8 resources, or final shortlist project generation  
9 expected to be enabled by the Gateway South transmission  
10 line, as identified in the Company's 2020AS RFP. Without  
11 these projects, the risk of shortfalls is increased as  
12 is the Company's reliance on energy markets. In their  
13 current states, the existing Rock River I facility is  
14 not operating as turbines have been removed pending the  
15 repowering of the sites. Repowering will allow the  
16 facility to once again provide energy and capacity to  
17 serve load and reduce market reliance, while allowing  
18 the newly installed turbines to qualify for substantial  
19 federal PTCs.

20 **Q. Were each of these facilities included in the Company's**  
21 **2021 IRP Update?**

22 A. Yes.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> PacifiCorp 2021 IRP Update (Mar. 31, 2022).



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24

**B. Assumptions and Results**

**Q. Has the Company performed updated analyses of the projects after filing the 2021 IRP?**

A. Yes. The Company performed a 30-year analysis of each project's economics through end-of-life using its PLEXOS modeling system, the same modeling system used for the 2021 IRP.

**Q. Please summarize the natural gas and CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions used in the economic analyses for each project.**

A. The economic analysis for each of the projects included four price-policy scenarios—representing low, medium, and high natural gas prices, and zero, medium, high, and the SCGHG CO<sub>2</sub> prices. The price-policy scenario that pairs medium natural gas prices with medium CO<sub>2</sub> prices is referred to as the "MM" scenario, the price-policy scenario that pairs low natural gas prices with a zero CO<sub>2</sub> price is referred to as the "LN" scenario, the price-policy scenario that pairs high natural gas prices with a high CO<sub>2</sub> price is referred to as the "HH" scenario, and the scenario that pairs medium natural gas prices with the SCGHG is referred to as the MM-SCGHG scenario. While the MM price-policy scenario represents the Company's "expected case" describing likely future

1 conditions, the LN, HH, and MM-SCGHG scenarios provide  
 2 informative analytical bookends scenarios.

3 Similar to the Company's other analyses, these  
 4 assumptions can influence the value of system energy,  
 5 the dispatch of system resources, and PacifiCorp's  
 6 resource mix. Consequently, wholesale-power prices and  
 7 CO<sub>2</sub> policy assumptions affect NPC, non-NPC variable-cost  
 8 benefits, and system fixed-cost benefits associated with  
 9 Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I. Because wholesale  
 10 power prices and CO<sub>2</sub> policy outcomes are both uncertain  
 11 and important drivers to the economic analysis, it is  
 12 important to evaluate a range of assumptions for these  
 13 variables. The natural gas and CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions are  
 14 summarized in Table 5.

**Table 5. Price-Policy Assumptions**

Price-Policy Scenario	Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Levelized \$/MMBtu) *	CO <sub>2</sub> Price Description
HH	\$5.64	22.57/ton starting 2025 rising to 102.48/ton in 2040
MM	\$4.44	\$9.93/ton starting in 2025 rising to \$57.94/ton in 2040
LN	\$2.94	None
MM-SCGHG	\$4.44	\$74.10/ton starting 2021 rising to \$150.38/ton in 2040
*Nominal levelized Henry Hub natural gas price from 2025 through 2040.		

1 **Q. Please describe the natural-gas price assumptions used**  
2 **in the price-policy scenarios.**

3 A. The medium natural gas price assumptions are from  
4 PacifiCorp's OFPC dated March 31, 2021, which was the  
5 most recent OFPC available when the modeling inputs were  
6 developed. The first 36 months of the OFPC reflect market  
7 forwards at the close of a given trading day, May 2021  
8 is the prompt month in this case. As such, these 36  
9 months are market forwards as of May 2021. The blending  
10 period (months 37 through 48) is calculated by averaging  
11 the month-on-month market forwards from the prior year  
12 with the month-on-month fundamentals-based price from  
13 the subsequent year. The fundamentals portion of the  
14 natural gas OFPC reflects Aurora-forecast prices.

15 **Q. Please describe the CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions used in the**  
16 **price-policy scenarios.**

17 A. PacifiCorp used four different CO<sub>2</sub> price scenarios—zero,  
18 medium, high, and the SCGHG. The medium scenario is  
19 derived from a survey of third-party industry experts,  
20 including I CERA, and Wood Mackenzie and the Energy  
21 Information Administration as well as CO<sub>2</sub> price  
22 assumptions used by peer utilities. Both the medium and  
23 high scenarios apply a CO<sub>2</sub> price as a tax beginning 2025.  
24 PacifiCorp also incorporated the SCGHG that is assumed  
25 to start in 2021 for Washington, and is applied such

1 that the SCGHG is reflected in market prices and dispatch  
2 costs for the purposes of developing each portfolio  
3 (i.e., incorporated into capacity expansion optimization  
4 modeling).

5 **Q. How did PacifiCorp pair the natural gas and CO<sub>2</sub> price**  
6 **assumptions for purposes of analyzing Foote Creek II-IV**  
7 **and Rock River I?**

8 A. Scenarios pairing medium gas prices with alternative CO<sub>2</sub>  
9 price assumptions reflect OFPC forwards through April  
10 2024 before transitioning to a fundamentals forecast.  
11 Scenarios using high or low gas prices, regardless of  
12 CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions, do not incorporate any market  
13 forwards because these scenarios are designed to reflect  
14 an alternative view to that of the market. As such, the  
15 low and high natural gas price scenarios are purely  
16 fundamental forecasts. Low and high natural gas price  
17 scenarios are also derived from expert third-party,  
18 multi-client, "off-the-shelf" subscription services.

19 **Q. Please explain how you conducted your analyses.**

20 A. The methodologies are consistent with the approach used  
21 to perform the economic analysis of portfolios in the  
22 2021 IRP. The system value of incremental wind energy  
23 from Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I are each  
24 calculated from two PLEXOS ST model simulations for a  
25 given price-policy scenario—one simulation with

1 incremental wind energy and one simulation without  
2 incremental wind energy. The system value of incremental  
3 wind energy is then converted to a dollar-per-\$/MWh  
4 value by dividing the change in annual system cost by  
5 the change in incremental wind energy for both price-  
6 policy scenarios through 2040. The value of wind energy  
7 is extended out through 2050 by extrapolating the system  
8 values calculated from modeled data over the 2038-2040  
9 timeframe. The assumed system value, expressed in  
10 dollars per\$/MWh, is applied to the incremental energy  
11 output associated with each of the wind repowering  
12 projects.

13 **Q. Were your initial economic analyses conducted before**  
14 **passage of the IRA?**

15 A. Yes.

16 **Q. How does the IRA impact your analyses?**

17 A. Based on existing law, PacifiCorp's initial economic  
18 analyses assumed that both Foote Creek II-IV and Rock  
19 River I qualified for 60 percent of available PTCs. After  
20 passage of the IRA, the Company understands that each  
21 facility now qualifies for 110 percent of available  
22 PTCs. The Company has updated its economic analyses to  
23 reflect the new PTC value for both projects, and the  
24 results are reflected in Tables 6 and 7 below.

1 Q. What are the results of your economic analyses for Foote  
2 Creek II-IV?

3 A. Table 6 summarizes the PVRR(d) customer benefits (or  
4 costs) of Foote Creek II-IV both before and after passage  
5 of the IRA.<sup>14</sup> This table also presents the same  
6 information on a levelized dollar-per-MWh basis.

**Table 6. Foote Creek II-IV (Benefits)/Costs**

<b>Price- Policy Scenario</b>	<b>Pre-IRA PVRR(d) (\$ million)</b>	<b>Pre-IRA Net Benefit (\$/MWh)</b>	<b>Post-IRA PVRR(d) (\$ million)</b>	<b>Post-IRA Net Benefit (\$/MWh)</b>
HH	(\$80.80)	(\$38/MWh)	(\$104.23)	(\$49/MWh)
MM	(\$53.07)	(\$25/MWh)	(\$76.49)	(\$36/MWh)
LN	\$17.09	\$8/MWh	(\$6.33)	(\$3/MWh)
MM-SCGHG	(\$142.77)	(\$67/MWh)	(\$166.19)	(\$78/MWh)

7 Prior to passage of the IRA, Foote Creek II-IV was  
8 expected to deliver \$53.07 million in present-value net  
9 customer benefits in the MM scenario, and \$80.8 million  
10 in the HH scenario. This is contrasted with \$17.09  
11 million cost in the LN scenario. Under the MM and HH  
12 scenarios, nominal levelized net benefits are \$25/MWh  
13 and \$38/MWh, respectively. Under the LN scenario there  
14 is a nominal levelized net cost of \$8/MWh.

15 After passage of the IRA, customer benefits  
16 increased substantially: Foote Creek II-IV will now  
17 deliver \$76.49 million in present-value net customer

---

<sup>14</sup> See also Confidential Exhibit No. 34.

1 benefits in the MM scenario and \$104.23 million in the  
 2 HH scenario.

3 Importantly, the only scenario where Foote Creek  
 4 II-IV was expected to generate customer costs prior to  
 5 passage of the IRA—the LN scenario (\$17.09 million)—has  
 6 transformed to a \$6.33 million customer benefit. These  
 7 benefits only increase under the highest cost of carbon  
 8 scenario (MM-SCGHG). While the Company decided to move  
 9 forward with Foote Creek II-IV prior to passage of the  
 10 IRA, the substantial post-IRA benefits continue to  
 11 support the Company’s decision to acquire and repower  
 12 the facilities.

13 **Q. What are the results of your economic analyses for Rock  
 14 River I?**

15 A. Table 7 summarizes the PVRR(d) customer benefits (or  
 16 costs) of Rock River I both before and after passage of  
 17 the IRA.<sup>15</sup> This table also presents the same information  
 18 on a levelized dollar-per-MWh basis.

**Table 7. Rock River I (Benefits)/Costs**

<b>Price-Policy Scenario</b>	<b>Pre-IRA PVRR(d) (\$ million)</b>	<b>Pre-IRA Net Benefit (\$/MWh)</b>	<b>Post-IRA PVRR(d) (\$ million)</b>	<b>Post-IRA Net Benefit (\$/MWh)</b>
HH	(\$67.76)	(\$31/MWh)	(\$91.69)	(\$43/MWh)
MM	(\$30.15)	(\$14/MWh)	(\$54.09)	(\$25/MWh)
LN	\$23.12	\$11/MWh	(\$15.12)	(\$7/MWh)
MM-SCGHG	(\$143.42)	(\$67/MWh)	(\$167.35)	(\$78/MWh)

<sup>15</sup> See also Confidential Exhibit No. 35.

1           Before passage of the IRA, Rock River I was expected  
2           to deliver \$30.15 million in present-value net customer  
3           benefits in the MM scenario, \$67.76 million in the HH  
4           scenario, and \$143.42 million in the MM-SCGHG scenario.  
5           This is contrasted with \$23.12 million cost in the LN  
6           scenario. Under the MM-SCGHG, MM and HH scenarios,  
7           nominal levelized net benefits are \$67/MWh, \$14/MWh and  
8           \$31/MWh, respectively. Under the LN scenario there is a  
9           nominal levelized net cost of \$11/MWh.

10           After passage of the IRA, customer benefits  
11           increased substantially: Rock River I will now deliver  
12           \$54.09 million in present-value net customer benefits in  
13           the MM scenario and \$91.69 million in the HH scenario.  
14           Importantly, the only scenario where Rock River I was  
15           expected to generate customer costs before passage of  
16           the IRA—the LN scenario (\$23.12 million)—has transformed  
17           to a \$15.12 million customer benefit. These benefits  
18           only increase under higher gas or CO<sub>2</sub> scenarios.

19   **Q. Are the Company's economic analyses of the expected**  
20   **customer benefits from Foote Creek II-IV and Rock**  
21   **River I conservative?**

22   A. Yes. The PVRR(d) results do not reflect the potential  
23   value of RECs generated by the incremental energy output  
24   from each of the wind facilities. Customer benefits for  
25   all price-policy scenarios would improve significantly



1 for every dollar assigned to the incremental RECs that  
2 will be generated through 2040, and these RECs can also  
3 be sold to reduce the revenue requirement impact of this  
4 resource.

5 **V. CONCLUSION**

6 **Q. Please summarize the conclusions of your testimony.**

7 A. PacifiCorp's economic analysis shows that the Company's  
8 decision to procure these resources are necessary, and  
9 each will provide substantial customer benefits compared  
10 to anticipated project costs.

11 **Q. What is your recommendation?**

12 A. I recommend that the Commission determine that the  
13 Company's decisions to acquire Rock Creek I, and acquire  
14 and repower Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I were  
15 prudent.

16 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

17 A. Yes.

**REDACTED**

Case No. PAC-E-24-04

Exhibit No. 32

Witness: Thomas R. Burns

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

---

**REDACTED**

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Thomas R. Burns

Rock Creek I and II Pre-IRA Combined Analysis

May 2024

**THIS EXHIBIT IS CONFIDENTIAL IN ITS  
ENTIRETY AND IS PROVIDED UNDER  
SEPARATE COVER**

**REDACTED**

Case No. PAC-E-24-04

Exhibit No. 33

Witness: Thomas R. Burns

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

---

**REDACTED**

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Thomas R. Burns

Rock Creek I and II Post-IRA Combined Analysis

May 2024

**THIS EXHIBIT IS CONFIDENTIAL IN ITS  
ENTIRETY AND IS PROVIDED UNDER  
SEPARATE COVER**

**REDACTED**

Case No. PAC-E-24-04

Exhibit No. 34

Witness: Thomas R. Burns

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

---

**REDACTED**

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Thomas R. Burns

Foote Creek II-IV Analysis

May 2024

**THIS EXHIBIT IS CONFIDENTIAL IN ITS  
ENTIRETY AND IS PROVIDED UNDER  
SEPARATE COVER**

**REDACTED**

Case No. PAC-E-24-04

Exhibit No. 35

Witness: Thomas R. Burns

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

---

**REDACTED**

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Thomas R. Burns

Rock River Analysis

May 2024



**THIS EXHIBIT IS CONFIDENTIAL IN ITS  
ENTIRETY AND IS PROVIDED UNDER  
SEPARATE COVER**